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Title VII Class Actions:
A New Era?
I. INTRODUCTION
Much litigation under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1
involves class actions.2 This result was a consequence of the Civil
Rights Act of 19643 which placed the primary enforcement mecha-
nisms of the Act in the hands of private parties.4 Reinforcing this
result was the conclusion by most federal courts that title VII ac-
tions were by definition class actions and that the requirements of
rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure5 could be met
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as title VIII.
2. In fact, class action boilerplate allegations have become so common in title
VII actions that they have been criticized by some courts. See Belcher v. Bas-
sett Furniture Indus., 588 F.2d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1978); Shelton v. Pargo, Inc.,
582 F.2d 1298, 1311 (4th Cir. 1978).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 5, 28, & 42 U.S.C.).
4. The private charging party was given the opportunity to bring suit under sec-
tion 706(f) (1) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (1976), along with a possi-
bility of court appointed attorneys, id., and authorization to get attorney fee
awards, § 2000e-5(k). The 1964 version of title VII only gave public enforce-
ment powers in pattern and practice suits to the attorney general upon rec-
ommendation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 706(d), 707(a), 78 Stat. 260, 261
(1964) (current versions at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f) (1), 2000e-6(a) (1976)). Leg-
islative history indicates that Congress was fearful of giving too broad en-
forcement powers to the EEOC. See 110 CONG. REC. 1518, 1521 (1964)
(remarks of Rep. Celler); Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. &
CoM. L. REV. 431, 436-37 (1966).
5. FED. R. Crv. P. 23 provides in relevant part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typ-
ical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
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with broad allegations in a complaint.6 These courts also liberally
construed rule 23(a) to allow what was termed an "across-the-
board" attack on an employer's employment policies. This doc-
trine permitted an employee, who was allegedly discriminated
against by an employer policy, to represent in a class action other
employees who were subject to different employment policies. 7
This view of title VII class actions was limited by the Supreme
Court in East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez8 and, more re-
cently, was rejected by the Supreme Court in General Telephone v.
Falcon9 which held that all the requirements of rule 230(a)1 must
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and
in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making ap-
propriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
any individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litiga-
tion concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of con-
centrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
The vast majority of title VII suits are brought under rule 23(b) (2) since title
VII is an equitable remedy and backpay is ancillary.
6. See, e.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Barnette
v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Tipler v. E. I duPont
deNemoures Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
7. See, e.g., Barnette v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975) (black former
employee would be a proper representative of all persons who were victims
of discriminatory employer policies despite how they experienced the dis-
crimination); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff who suffered
promotion discrimination can represent a broad class of persons who suf-
fered other types of discrimination).
8. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
9. 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982).
10. The requirements of rule 23(a) are usually referred to respectively as
(a) (1) numerousity, (a) (2) commonality, (a) (3) typicality, and
(a) (4) adequacy. See supra note 5. Along with meeting these four require-
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be met to certify a title VII class action."
These Supreme Court decisions should cause legal theorists
and practicing attorneys to wonder how the circuit courts went
ments a plaintiff wishing to certify a class must meet one of the subdivision
(b) requirements. Civil rights class actions are normally brought under sub-
division (b) (2) because of the equitable nature of the civil rights remedyand
it is administratively easier for plaintiffs since there is no opt out provision
and no notice requirement as there is in subdivision (b) (3). See Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975); 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.40(1) (2d ed. 1982) (Because of older case
law in the civil rights area seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the 1966
Advisory Committee Note referred to civil rights litigation to illustrate the
scope of subdivision (b) (2).); Bridgesmith, Representing the Title VII Class
Action: A Question of Degree, 26 WAYNE L REV. 1413, 1425 (1980) (rule
23(b) (2) is preferable because rule 23(b) (3) requires mandatory notice to be
given to absent class members which "can be expensive and problematic
where a large putative class is alleged"). The mandatory notice provision for
rule 23(b) (3) is found in subdivision (c) (2) which provides:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practi-
cable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice
shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from
the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not re-
quest exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclu-
sion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2).
Any notice ordered to be sent in a subdivision (b) (2) class action would
be discretionary and ordered pursuant to subdivision (d) which allows for
court discretion in conducting the class action. Rule 23(d) provides:
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders:
(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures
to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the mem-
bers of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that
notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all
of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of
the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
(3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on interven-
ors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate there-
from allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the
action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural mat-
ters. The orders may be combined with an order under rule 16, and
may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
An extreme use of this discretion occurred in Miller v. Central Chinchilla
Group, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 411 (S.D. Iowa 1975), where the court ordered notice
sent to prospective class members informing them of their right to intervene
because the class failed to be certified. But see Pan Am. World Airways v.
United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975); Cherner v. Transition
Elec. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962).
11. 102 S. Ct. at 2373.
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astray by liberally construing rule 23 requirements and how the
enforcement mechanisms of title VII will operate after Falcon and
Rodriguez. This Comment will address these questions and ex-
amine the policy basis of the Supreme Court decisions.
H1. LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Legislative History
The Civil Rights Act of 187012 guaranteed blacks the right to
contract and to possess and convey property while the Civil Rights
Act of 187113 guaranteed blacks the right to be free of racial dis-
crimination by the authority of state and local law. By 1960, how-
ever, these acts seemed clearly inadequate to deal with racial
discrimination.14 Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 which included title VII.15 The general purpose of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to hasten the elimination of discrimi-
nation;16 the purpose of title VII was to eliminate discrimination in
employment.17
A major issue which Congress faced in enacting title VII was
how to enforce it. Several enforcement alternatives were consid-
ered.18 One alternative recommended that a body similar to the
National Labor Relations Board be established with a commission
divided into an investigating and prosecuting office and a quasi ju-
dicial board.' 9 The House version of title VII did not accept this
12. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 1144 (1870) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976)).
13. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)). Congress sought to reach conspiracies with the Act of April 20, 1871,
ch. 22, § 2,17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976)). The Supreme
Court has interpreted § 1983(3) so as to reach conspiracies between solely
private parties. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
14. See infra note 16 and accompanying text see generally U.S. COIM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, EMPLOYMENT 1961 REPORT (1961); see also Report of U.S. Comm'n on
Civil Rights, 48 LR.RM. (BNA) 103 (1961).
15. See supra note 1.
16. This was part of the general statement in the judiciary committee report on
the House bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The report states:
"[I] n the last decade it has become increasingly clear that progress has been
too slow and that national legislation is required to meet a national need
which becomes ever more obvious." 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391,
2393.
17. HR. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(a) (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2401.
18. See generally Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHL L REv., 688, 692-
96 (1980) (discusses the legislative debate on enforcement alternatives).
19. In discussing this alternative, Vaas states:
HR. 405... provided for an administrative agency, comparable to
the NLRB, with the authority to hold hearings and issue cease-and-
desist orders, enforceable in court, after a finding of discrimination in
1983]
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alternative, but it did give the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) enforcement powers to bring civil suits. 2 0 A
Senate amendment, however, eventually stripped these powers al-
lowing the Commission only the power to recommend to the Attor-
ney General that suit be instituted.2 1 This congressional
background made it clear that once title VII was passed the pri-
mary enforcement mechanism of the Act would be charging par-
ties in private civil suits. Class actions as an enforcement
mechanism were not explicitly sanctioned in the statute or its leg-
islative history.22
Some legislative history regarding title VII class actions is,
however, evident in Congress amendment of title VII with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.23 The original House
amendment of title VII prohibited class actions.24 This House bill,
however, did nto survive in the Senate.25 In the Senate's Labor
hiring or union membership. The administrative agency would have
been an "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" consisting
of an "Equal Employment Opportunity Board" and an "Office of the
Administrator of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission."
The Board would have been responsible for the judicial function of
hearing and deciding the complaints brought before it by the Office
of the Administrator.
Vaas, supra note 4, at 435.
20. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707(b) (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2404. See Vaas, supra note 4, at 436-37.
21. See Vaas, supra note 4, at 452-53.
22. See Ruthergien, supra note 18, at 695-96. Rutherglen discussed the reasons
for this lack of legislative history:
Class actions escaped congressional notice in part because they did
not attain prominence until the 1966 revision of rule 23, but more sig-
nificantly, because Congress expressly dealt with the issue of class-
wide litigation by granting authority to the Attorney General to bring
pattern-or-practice actions. Congress also denied authority to pri-
vate persons to fie administrative charges on behalf of others, sug-
gesting that, far from endorsing class action, it intended at that time
to preclude private authority to litigate on behalf of others.
Id. (footnote omitted).
23. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17 (1976)) [hereinafter
cited as 1972 Act].
24. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § (e) (1971), reprinted in Hearings on S. 2515, S.
2617, H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 40-46 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. The relevant portion of the bill read:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of
an individual as a member of a union or the hiring, reinstatement or
promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of
any backpay, if such individual. . . neither filed a charge nor was
named in a charge or amendment thereto ....
Id. at 46. See Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 838-39 (1972).
25. See Sape & Hart, supra note 24, at 840-45.
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and Public Welfare Committee, Senator Dominick introduced a
bill which also prohibited class actions,2 6 but the bill was not ac-
cepted by the committee.2 7 Instead, the final Senate committee re-
port rejecting the House bill affirmed the committee's belief in
class actions. The report stated: "The committee agrees with the
courts that title VII actions are by their very nature class com-
plaints, and that any restriction on such actions would greatly un-
dermine the effectiveness of title VII."28 The final bill adopted in
197229 did not mention class actions 30 but did do the following:
granted the EEOC the power to sue, extended the period for filing
individual suits and filing with the EEOC, and expanded the Act to
cover more employers.3 1 The legislative history shows that there
was some support for the use of class actions, but, at most, it indi-
cates that Congress by enacting the 1972 Act32 did not wish to re-
strict the use of private class actions. Such legislative history is a
weak hook on which to hang a claim that Congress endorsed a lib-
eral construction of rule 23 in the title VII setting.33
26. S. 2617, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. § (e) (1971), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 24,
at 33-39. Senator Dominick's bill was identical to the House bill. See Sape &
Hart, supra note 24, at 840-41.
27. See Sape & Hart, supra note 24, at 843-44.
28. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG. 2D SESS. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTuNrTY ACT OF 1972, at 436 (1972).
29. See supra note 23.
30. In regard to class actions, Senator Harrison Williams explained the enforce-
ment provisions of the 1972 Act-
[I]t is not intended that any of the provisions contained therein are
designed to affect the present use of class action lawsuits under Title
VII in conjunction with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure .... [L] eading cases in this area to date have recognized that
Title VII claims are necessarily class action complaints and that, ac-
cordingly, it is not necessary that each individual entitled to relief
under the claim be named in the original charge or in the claim for
relief.
118 CONG. REC. 4942 (1972). This statement is an explanation of the Senate
amendment, S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), authorizing private persons
to fie charges on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved.
31. See Rutherglen, supra note 18, at 719-20.
32. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 4(a), 5, 86
Stat. 104, 107 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f) (1), 2000e-6(c) (1976)).
Generally, this Act increases EEOC enforcement powers.
33. In fact, the plaintiff's brief in Falcon did not claim that Congress endorsed
the liberal use of class actions; instead, it stated: "In the face of such explicit
Congressional intent and endorsement of the role and importance of class
actions in combatting employment discrimination, this Court should not
adopt a procedural limitation that would destroy the utility of the class action
as a device to effectuate title VIrs broad remedial purposes." Brief for Re-
spondent at 21, General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982) (emphasis
added).
1983]
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B. Case Authority
1. Focus on the Effects of the Relief Sought
Unlike the murky legislative history, case law under the Civil
Rights Acts and title VII has dealt directly with the class action
issue. Many cases brought under the Civil Rights Acts and de-
cided prior to the 1964 Act dealt with claims by plaintiffs for class-
wide relief.34 These cases commonly focused on the effect of the
relief sought by the plaintiff in deciding the class action issue.
In Bailey v. Patterson3 5 black plaintiffs sought to bring a class
action challenging Mississippi's segregation statutes as they ap-
plied to common carriers.3 6 The Fifth Circuit in Bailey avoided the
class action issue, finding that the relief sought by the representa-
tive plaintiffs would run to the class. The court stated: "[T] he
very nature of the rights appellants seek to vindicate required that
the decree run to the benefit not only of appellants but also for all
persons similarly situated."37
This focus on the effect of the relief sought to decide if an action
should be considered a class action was also important in Brunson
v. Board of Trustees.38 In Brunson, black plaintiffs challenged a
school district's biracial method of assigning students. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit faced the issue of whether the plaintiff could
bring the suit as a class action. The court concluded that there
were common questions of fact such that the action could proceed
as a spurious class action under rule 23(a) (3).39 In so holding, the
court noted that if classwide relief was given, problems within the
segregated school system would not be as obscured and would be-
come more apparent to school administrators. 40
This policy of allowing class actions in discrimination suits fo-
cusing on the effect of the relief sought was endorsed in the key
34. See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963); Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d
284 (5th Cir. 1963); Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962).
35. 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963).
36. One of the challenged statutes applicable to railroads read: "If... a railroad
shall fail ... to divide the passenger cars by partition, to secure separate
accommodations for the white and colored races... or... fail to assign each
passenger to the car used for the race to which the passenger belongs, he or it
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor...." MISS. CODE ANN. § 2351 (1942).
37. 323 F.2d at 206.
38. 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962).
39. Prior to the 1966 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
23(a) (3) provided for spurious class actions. In reality this type of class ac-
tion was a permissive joinder device which would not bind persons who were
not parties to the action. The device was designed to be used when there
were many persons interested in a common question of law or fact and the
persons were interested in resolving "a litigious situation." See 2 J. MOORE &
J. FRIEDMAN, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.04 (1938).
40. 311 F.2d at 109.
[Vol. 62:130
TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS
title VII class action case, Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.41 In Hall, the
court extended the customary judicial doctrine of allowing class
actions when challenging facially discriminatory employer poli-
cies,42 to actions where the discriminatory practice occurs apart
from an avowed policy of discrimination. 43 The court allowed this
extension focusing on the remedy sought. The court stated: "For
purposes of allowing a class action for injunctive relief, however,
this court is unable to perceive any real distinction between a pol-
icy which is discriminatory on its face and a policy which is shown
to exist and to be discriminatory only by analysis of its application
.... "44 The court went on to say that "[r] acial discrimination is
by definition class discrimination. If it exists, it applies throughout
the class." 45 This point made in Hall led to a circuit court doctrine
of liberally certifying title VII class actions and extending this cer-
tification to across-the-board attacks on an employer's employ-
ment policies.4 6
2. Focus on Alleged Act and Title VII Purposes
The Fifth Circuit, relying on Hall, was the first circuit to en-"
dorse a policy of liberally certifying title VII class actions and be-
came the most adamant circuit in justifying its approach. In
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,47 the Fifth Circuit held
that an employee alleging that he was discriminatorily discharged
and not seeking reinstatement could be a class representative of
employees allegedly harmed by discrimination in hiring, firing,
promotion, and use of company facilities.4 8 The court justified its
41. 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
42. See Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930, 938 (5th Cir. 1958) (class action inappropri-
ate due to factual differences in denying blacks the right to vote); Johnson v.
Yeilding, 165 F. Supp. 76, 79 (D.D.C. 1958) (class action appropriate where
blacks challenge denial of application forms and right to take the police exam
for possible hire); see also Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956).
43. 251 F. Supp. at 186.
44. Id. The court held that class certification was proper for injunctive relief but
not for compensatory relief for past discrimination. Cases since Hall have
bifurcated proceedings with one focusing on individual liability and relief,
and the other on class liability and relief. International Bd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358-62 (1977). The point of the textual quote, how-
ever, is that in order to determine if there were common questions of law or
fact the court focused on the effect of the relief sought. See infra notes 52-53
and accompanying text.
45. 251 F. Supp. at 186. The statement seems to be a truism.
46. See Rutherglen, supra note 18, at 709 ("[T]he Fifth Circuit transformed the
reasoning of Hall into a doctrine supporting certification of 'across-the-board'
title VII class actions.").
47. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969) (interlocutory appeal).
48. In Johnson, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), the plaintiff worked for defendant,
Georgia Highway Express, for many years. When the company held a meet-
1983]
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position stating:
While it is true, as the lower court points out, that there are different fac-
tual questions with regard to different employees, it is also true that the
"Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial
class [and] is a question common to all members of the class." 4 9
Johnson marked the beginning of a court doctrine5 0 which allowed
an employee, allegedly discriminated against in some manner, to
maintain an across-the-board attack challenging all of an em-
ployer's employment policies by representing all employees who
would have been subject to such policies.5 1
The Fifth Circuit in adopting this doctrine failed to note an im-
portant distinction made in Hall. In Hall the court noted that the
commonality requirement of rule 23(a) was met by focusing on the
effect of the relief sought.5 2 The Hall court stated:
The Court is of the opinion therefore, that a significant question of fact
common to all members of the class exists in this case insofar as the com-
plaint seeks the removal of the alleged discriminatory policies. To the ex-
tent that it seeks redress for past effects of the alleged discrimination,
however, the controlling questions of fact are not common to the entire
class. 5
3
This focus on the effect of the relief sought was not discussed in
Johnson. The Johnson opinion can be seen as the beginning of lib-
erally certifying title VII class actions without focusing on the ef-
ing of its black employees to hear their grievances, Johnson inquired as to
when blacks could apply for jobs not then held by blacks. Several weeks af-
ter this meeting Johnson was discharged. Defendant claimed Johnson was
discharged for failure to regularly report to work. The district court limited
the class to persons discharged because of race. Id. at 1123-24.
49. Id. at 1124 (quoting Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966)).
50. Among the cases leading up to the Johnson decision included Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968), which held that membership in
a class action was not restricted to individuals filing charges with the EEOC.
The court held that to bring such a class action the plaintiff had to meet the
requirements of rule 23(a) and rule 23(b) (2), and had to have standing to
raise the issues considered in the suit. Oatis was subsequently relied upon
in Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968), where the court
held that a subsequent acceptance of a promotion by a plaintiff did not render
his suit moot as to himself individually or the class he represented. The Fifth
Circuit based its decision on the remedies still available to the class and the
employee, including backpay and injunctive relief.
51. See, e.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1975); Barnette v.
W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.
Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
52. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
53. 251 F. Supp. at 186. The quote not only indicates that the court was following
a judicial doctrine which did not allow classwide compensatory relief, but
also indicates that the court realized that the rule 23 requirements were met
because the relief sought would remove the employer's discriminatory
policies.
[Vol. 62:130
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fect of the remedy sought but, instead, focusing on the alleged act
of discrimination.54
Many other courts soon followed the Johnson approach. Some,
however, rationalized liberal certification based on the remedial
policy of title VII.S5 In Rich v. Martin Marietta Co7p.56 the Tenth
Circuit focused on the purposes of title VII in allowing an across-
the-board attack stating:
Class actions are generally appropriate in title VII employment discrimi-
nation cases. The reason for this is that although these suits are self-help
* * . actions, they also have a broad public interest in that they seek to
enforce fundamental constitutional principles as well as advance the
rights of individual plaintiffs who bring the action.
5 7
In sum, many courts began to liberally grant class certification in
title VII actions, basing their decisions on the nature of discrimina-
tion and the purposes of title VII.58
3. Rodriguez and Falcon
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court attempted to limit
this liberal certification doctrine in East Texas Motor Freight v.
Rodriguez.59 In Rodriguez, Mexican-American plaintiffs were city
truck drivers for an employer who had a division of city truck driv-
ers and a division of line truck drivers. The employer had a policy
which disallowed transfers between the two divisions. The plain-
tiffs brought a title VII action claiming to represent all of the em-
ployer's black and Mexican-American city drivers and all black
and Mexican-American applicants for line driver positions. At trial
the plaintiffs failed to move for class certification,6 0 and the trial
54. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1975); Bar-
nette v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1975); Bormann v. Long
Island Press Publishing Co., 379 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D. N.Y. 1974); McBroom
v. Western Elec. Co., 7 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9347, at 7573 (M.D.N.C. 1974);
Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 10, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975).
56. 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
57. Id. at 340.
58. Some district courts refused to allow such liberal certification, instead requir-
ing the plaintiff to meet all the rule 23(a) requirements. In Harriss v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24, 38-46 (N.D. Cal. 1977), the court set out dif-
ferent factors which are relevant in looking at each rule 23 requirement. See
also Elliott v. Sperry Rand Corp., 16 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1557 (D.
Minn. 1976); Williams v. Wallace Silversmith, Inc., 75 F.LD. 633 (D. Conn.
1976), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1977).
59. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
60. In Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977), the Supreme Court described the district
court proceeding.
Following trial, the District Court dismissed the class action allega-
tions. It stressed the plaintiffs' failure to move for a prompt determi-
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court found that the employer's seniority and no transfer policies
were not discriminatory. On appeal the Fifth Circuit certified a
class of all Mexican-American and black city drivers included in
the collective bargaining agreement.6 1 The appellate court also re-
versed the trial court's finding of no liability, concluding that the
union and employer were liable for hiring discrimination and for
maintaining discriminatory seniority62 and no transfer policies. 63
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit, finding that
the district court did not err.64 The Court first found that the plain-
tiffs were not members of the class they wished to represent be-
cause: (1) they were not qualified to be hired as line drivers 65 and
(2) each plaintiff stipulated that he was not discriminated against
when initially hired.66 Second, the Court found that the plaintiffs
were not adequate class representatives because they failed to
move for class certification prior to trial,67 and a "conflict [existed]
between the vote by members of the class rejecting a merger of the
city- and line-driver collective bargaining units, and the demand in
nation of the propriety of class certification, their failure to offer
evidence on that question, their concentration at trial on their indi-
vidual claims, their stipulation that the only issue to be determined
concerned the company's failure to act on their applications, and the
fact that, contrary to the relief sought, . . . a large majority of the
membership of Local 657 had recently rejected a proposal calling for
the merger of city-driver and line-driver seniority lists with free
transfers between jobs.
Id. at 400. The Fifth Circuit felt that the responsibility for determining class
certification rested with the trial court. 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. 505 F.2d at 52. Note that the Fifth Circuit did not allow the class to include all
black applicants for the line driver positions. The court stated: "The plain-
tiffs never pursued the action on behalf of these individuals, and the district
court's dismissal of the class action on their behalf was proper." Id.
62. The Fifth Circuit only found the local and the Southern Conference of Team-
sters liable for establishing separate seniority lists. Id. at 60-61.
63. Id. at 52-61.
64. East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977). As to
liability with regard to the representative plaintiffs, the Court stated: "The
District Court found upon abundant evidence that these plaintiffs lacked the
qualifications to be hired as line drivers. Thus, they could have suffered no
injury as a result of the alleged discriminatory practice .... ." Id. at 403-04
(footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 403 n.9. In footnote nine, the Court listed the qualification problems
with the representative plaintiffs. The problems included lack of experience,
poor driving records, poor work records, and poor physical conditions.
66. Id. at 403-04. The Court stated, "[E]ach named plaintiff stipulated that he
had not been discriminated against with respect to his initial hire. In light of
that stipulation they were hardly in a position to mount a classwide attack on
the no-transfer rule and the seniority system. . . ." Id. at 404.
67. Id. at 405. In pertinent part, rule 23(c) (1) states: "As soon as practicable af-
ter the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall
determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c) (1).
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the plaintiffs complaint for just such a merger."68 This combina-
tion of factors was sufficient to deny class certification despite the
Court's assertion that it was "not unaware that suits alleging racial
or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits
involving classwide wrongs." 69
Various interpretations of the impact of Rodriguez on title VII
class actions soon emerged in the circuit courts.70 One line of
cases distinguished Rodriguez as only mandating that where a rep-
resentative plaintiffs claim lacks merit, he cannot bring a class-
wide attack.7 1 Some post-Rodriguez cases took a view of liberally
reading the rule 23 requirements only when a representative plain-
tiff could point to a discrete discriminatory employer policy.72
Other cases liberally read the requirements once the representa-
tive plaintiff demonstrated that he was an adequate class repre-
sentative.7 3 Finally, a significant line of cases felt that Rodriguez
signaled an end to across-the-board attacks and required a repre-
68. 431 U.S. at 405 (footnote omitted).
69. Id.
70. See Note, How Far Across the Board The Permissible Breadth of Title VII
Class Actions, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 61 (1982) (The author advocated the "1interme-
diate" interpretation of Rodriguez to allow an across-the-board attack if the
plaintiff demonstrates a clearly identifiable employer policy which is
discriminatory.).
71. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 993 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 445 U.S. 940 (1980)
(plaintiff must suffer discrimination in some respect but it is not necessary
for the discrimination to be suffered in the same way); Gilchrist v. Bolger, 89
F.R.D. 402, 405 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (plaintiff must make a showing of a sufficient
nexus with the putative class and its interests); Bartelson v. Dean Witter &
Co., 29 FED. R. SERV. 2d (Callaghan) 302, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Rodriguez only
bars across-the-board class suit where plaintiff is discriminated against);
Beasley v. Griffin, 81 F.R.D. 114,116 (D. Mass. 1979) ("Rodriguez holds simply
that a court may not certify a class action where trial on the merits has shown
the named plaintiffs have no claim"); Arnett v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 78
F.R.D. 73, 77 n.6 (D.D.C. 1978) (in Rodriguez the "Supreme Court intended to
preclude maintenance of a class action by one who was not discriminated
against at all").
72. See, e.g., Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982),
vacated, 103 S. Ct. 35 (1982) (employer practice of denying employment to
persons with certain types of criminal records); Stastn v. Southern Bell TeL &
Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 280 n.20 (4th Cir. 1980) (in a multi-facility class action
plaintiff cannot only rely on systemwide disparities); Hauck v. Xerox Corp.,
78 F.R.D. 375, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (identifiable employer policy which is obvi-
ously applicable to others in like status with the plaintiff must be shown or
the employer must admit that the policy identified was applied to all
employees).
73. See, e.g., Doe v. First City Bankcorp of Texas, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 562, 570 (S.D. Tex.
1978) (Under Rodriguez the plaintiff must show a nexus with the class he
hopes to represent.); Wajda v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 80 F.R.D. 303,
308 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Rodriguez does not reject the across-the-board approach
but only involved class membership, standing, and adequacy).
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sentative plaintiff to meet all the rule 23 requirements to represent
a class. 74
To the extent that this latter line of cases held that a represen-
tative plaintiff had to meet all the rule 23(a) requirements, 7 5 it was
validated by the Supreme Court in General Telephone Co. v. Fal-
con.76 In Falcon, a Mexican-American employee of the defendant
was discriminated against by being refused a promotion.7 7 The is-
sue was whether Falcon could maintain a class action on behalf of
both Mexican-American employees who were denied promotions
and Mexican-American applicants who were denied
employment.7 8
The district court in Falcon, without conducting an evidentiary
hearing, certified a class including Mexican-American employees
and Mexican-American applicants for employment who had not
been hired.7 9 As to liability, the district court found that the plain-
tiff was not discriminated against when hired but was discrimi-
nated against by being denied a promotion. 80 With regard to the
class, the district court found no discrimination in promotion but
did find discrimination in the defendant's hiring process.8 1 At a
liability hearing after the trial, the district court awarded thirteen
applicants backpay.82 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
74. See, e.g., Abron v. Black & Decker, 654 F.2d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1981) (Rodriguez
expressly discredits the across-the-board approach); Patterson v. General
Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 1980) (under Rodriguez a plaintiff
must satisfy all the rule 23(a) requirements); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 581 F.2d 1304, 1308 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court did not err in denying
class certification based on Rodriguez).
75. The cases, however, were not validated to the extent they held that across-
the-board suits were no longer permitted under rule 23. See infra notes 107-
111 and accompanying text.
76. 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982).
77. The plaintiff was originally hired as part of an affirmative action program of
the defendant. He was promoted twice, first to lineman and then to lineman-
in-charge. During 1971 and 1972, Falcon sought a promotion to field inspector.
He did not receive the promotion but other non-Mexican-Americans did.
Brief of Petitioner at 2, General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982).
78. 102 S. Ct. at 2366.
79. In Falcon's EEOC charge and in his complaint he never alleged that he was
discriminated against when hired. Brief of Petitioner at 3.
80. The district court based its decision on its finding that General Telephone's
reasons for promoting other men were "insufficient and subjective." Falcon
v. General Tel. Co., 626 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1980).
81. In finding there was hiring discrimination the district court relied on statis-
tics which showed that Mexican-Americans represented 5.24% of the work
force in the relevant area while, in 1972, only 1.22% of General's employees
were Mexican-American. 626 F.2d at 372.
82. At the liability hearing, the district court found most of the applicants had
been properly rejected, but most of the defendant's liability arose from its
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the district court's class certification.83 The court stated: "[T]his
Court permits an employee complaining of one employment prac-
tice to represent another complaining of another practice, if the
plaintiff and members of the class suffer from essentially the same
injury. In this case, all of the claims are based on discrimination
because of national origin."84 The Fifth Circuit asserted that while
similarity based on national origin discrimination was not disposi-
tive in this case it weighed toward allowing class certification given
the "similarity of interests based on job location, job function and
other considerations." 85
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's approval of
class certification.8 6 The Court felt that the district court erred in
certifying the plaintiff's proposed class based merely on allega-
tions in the complaint instead of requiring a showing that all rule
23(a) requirements had been met.87 While the Court reiterated
that it agreed with the rationale of the across-the-board doctrine
that "racial discrimination by definition is class discrimination," 88
it could not agree that allegations of discrimination were sufficient
to meet the requirements of rule 23(a).89
practice of only keeping applications active for 90 days. Falcon v. General
Tel Co., 463 F. Supp. 315, 317 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
83. 626 F.2d at 375.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 376. The court did not explain this similarity analysis but only cited
Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980). In Crawford the
district court denied certification because the plaintiffs did not show that the
discrimination extended beyond the promotion system into the hiring prac-
tices. It is hard to see how Falcon is reconciled with Crawford.
86. 102 S. Ct. at 2371-73. The Court identified the problem with the class certifica-
tion stating.
Respondent's complaint provided an insufficient basis for concluding
that the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in promotion
would require the decision of any common question concerning the
failure of petitioner to hire more Mexican-Americans. Without any
specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact that
were common to the claims of respondent and the members of the
class he sought to represent, it was error for the District Court to
presume that respondent's claim was typical of other claims against
petitioner by Mexican-American employees and applicants.
Id. at 2371 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 2372-73. The Court stated: "[W]e reiterate today that a title VII class
action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of rule 23(a) have
been satisfied." Id.
88. Id. at 2370-71.
89. Id. at 2371. The Court set out this proposition stating:
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual's claim
that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and
his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy
of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of persons who
have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the indi-
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III. GUIDANCE
Three main concepts which the Supreme Court believes should
govern title VII class actions are evident in Rodriguez and Falcon.
These include:
(1) Rule 23 policies must be read together with title VII
policies.90
(2) If all rule 23(a) requirements are met, a plaintiff can
represent employees discriminated against by em-
ployer policies even though the discrimination was
manifested in differing ways, e.g., promotions versus
hiring.9 1
(3) The Court believes that primary inquiries in title VII
class actions involve judicial economy and adequacy
of representation. 92
The first concept delineated above is evident in both Falcon
and Rodriguez. The Court recognized the dual policies of rule 23
and title VII in Falcon when it stated that "actual, not presumed,
conformance with rule 23(a) remains... indispensable." 93 Like-
wise, in Rodriguez, it stated that "careful attention to the require-
ments of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 remains nonetheless
indispensable."94 In both cases the Court was faced with the prob-
lem of how to read two policy determinations, one in rule 2395 and
the other in title VII,96 together. The Court in both instances
seemed, at least facially, to choose an approach which read rule 23
as limiting the antidiscrimination policy of title VII. Therefore, the
question posed is why the Court chose this approach rather than
reading each statute in harmony. Indeed, the federal rules are
designed so that they do not limit meritorious claims with proce-
dural obstacles, 97 and in title VII Congress sought to provide a
vidual's claim and the class claims will share common questions of
law or fact and that the individual's claim will be typical of the class
claims.
Id. (footnote omitted).
90. See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
93. 102 S. Ct. at 2372.
94. 431 U.S. at 405.
95. For a good discussion of the theories behind the use of class actions, see De-
velopments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1318 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Developments ]. In Developments, the authors contend that the
revised rule 23 was drafted around the two problems of due process and res
judicata. Id. at 1323.
96. See generally supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
97. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the rules "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." Professor Moore commented on the construction of the rules stating
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remedy for discrimination in all phases of employment by allowing
private litigants to bring suit.98 Notwithstanding, the Court's re-
sult could be premised on these two assumptions: First, the policy
behind rule 23(a) is to allow class actions as a form of representa-
tive litigation,99 and it is difficult to determine whether a plaintiff
will be an adequate class representative without a showing similar
to what rule 23(a) requires;100 and second, a policy behind title VII
is to give those individuals injured by discrimination a means to
redress that injury.l0 l Therefore, if a court cannot be guaranteed
that a plaintiff will be able to fully and adequately litigate class
claims, it should not permit class certification because a member
of a class so certified would be bound by an adverse finding and
thereby could be denied redress for an injury suffered. 0 2 This
preclusive effect of an adverse class finding can seldom be avoided
since most class actions under title VII are brought under rule
23(b) (2)103 which does not permit opting out of the class. 04 So it
All such provisions, considered as a whole, and particularly with rule
61 on harmless error, temper the discretionary power of the court
with instructions as to the liberality of its application, "to the end
that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according
to the substantive rights of the parties."
2 J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE T 1.13(1), at 281-82 (2d ed.
1982) (footnote omitted). The construction called for in the text focuses on
the federal rules in general and not just rule 23.
98. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 18-
22.
99. See Developments, supra note 95, at 1321-22. A discussion of the 1966 amend-
ments to the federal rules by Professor Kaplan clearly indicates the purpose
of rule 23 is to provide a method whereby representative litigation can be had.
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HIARv. L. REV. 356, 376-400 (1967). See
generally 3B J. MooRE & J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.02(1),
at 41-42 (2d ed. 1982).
100. See generally Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
216 (1973) ('To have standing to sue as a class representative it is essential
that a plaintiff must be a part of that class, that is, he must possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class he
represents.").
101. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
102. This is based on the assumption that the suit is brought under rule 23(b) (2)
as most civil rights suits are. See supra note 10, and infra note 103 and ac-
companying text.
103. Almost all title VII class actions are brought under rule 23(b) (2). Advisory
Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966). See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508
F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1975).
104. FED. R. Cry. P. 23(c) (3). This rule provides in pertinent part: '"The judgment
in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom
the court finds to be members of the class." If a class is certified as a rule
23(b) (3) class, opting out is permitted. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (2); see also 3B J.
MooRE & J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.40(3), at 300-02 (2d ed.
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seems that given the rule 23 representative litigation policy and
the title VII policy of providing redress for injury, it could be ar-
gued that the Court in Rodriguez and Falcon did attempt to read
these somewhat different interests in harmony.105 The problem
with such a conclusion is that it ignores the adverse impact on un-
named class members which results from denying class certifica-
tion. While these unnamed class members will not be bound by an
adverse class finding, they also will have reduced means to redress
their injury since their opportunity to file a timely charge will have
passed06 and the named plaintiffs can no longer vindicate their
interests. The failure of the Court to recognize this adverse impact
could be the result of the Court putting undue emphasis on the
preclusive effect of judgments in a rule 23(b) (2) class action.
A second notable aspect of Falcon and Rodriguez is that they
do not bar a plaintiff from representing members of a class dis-
criminated against in ways different from those alleged by the rep-
resentative plaintiff.107 To bring such an action, however, the
plaintiff would have to point to a general employment policy which
affected both him and the class.108 The Court in Falcon addressed
this issue: "Significant proof that an employer operated under a
general policy of discrimination conceivably could justify a class of
both applicants and employees if the discrimination manifested it-
self in hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion,
such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes."' 09
Therefore, plaintiffs who wish to bring such suits will have to iden-
tify general policies which affect both the plaintiff and the class
members he seeks to represent. It is clear that simply alleging a
policy of discrimination will not meet this burden." 0 Contrary to
what many courts after Rodriguez believed, the above statement
from Falcon indicates that across-the-board attacks are not pro-
1982) (courts should be more reluctant to certify (b) (2) classes due to the res
judicata impact); supra note 10.
105. This seems clear since rule 23 allows class litigation where a plaintiff is repre-
sentative of class members and his litigation of such claims would be man-
ageable, and it would be contrary to title VII policy to bar private employees
from litigating their claims when their claims were not represented ade-
quately in a class suit.
106. See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
108. This requirement to bring forth evidence indicating that the employer has a
general discriminatory policy is similar to the holdings of some post-Rodri-
guez cases. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The requisite showing
after Falcon is, however, more stringent since the plaintiff must also show
that all the rule 23(a) requirements are met.
109. 102 S. Ct. at 2371-72 n.15.
110. This is because a plaintiff must show the policy affected both him and the
class he seeks to represent. The plaintiff will also have to show that he meets
all the rule 23 requirements.
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hibited by rule 23. The point is that a plaintiff now will have to
make a showing of a common discriminatory policy that both he
and the class are subject to and also meet the rule 23(a)
requirements."'
Finally, after Falcon and Rodriguez, a plaintiffs primary focus
in seeking class certification should be on judicial economy and
adequacy of representation. In Falcon, the Court noted that judi-
cial economy was not advanced as evidenced by the district court's
bifurcated liability findings." 2 Quoting from American Pipe &
Construction Co. v. Utah,"3 the Court found that the plaintiff's
class action "did not advance 'the efficiency and economy of litiga-
tion which is a principal purpose of the procedure.' ""14 Similarly,
the Court stated that one factor bearing on the rule 23 typicality
and commonality requirements was judicial economy.1S This em-
phasis on judicial economy is consistent with a primary purpose of
rule 23: to avoid multiple suits." 6
Adequacy of representation also is a primary requirement
within rule 23 after the Court's focus on this requirement in Rodri-
guez and its discussion of adequacy in Falcon. In Rodriguez the
Court held that the plaintiffs were not adequate representatives of
the class they sought to represent due to their lack of diligence in
moving for class certification and due to their possible conflicts of
interest." 7 Similarly in Falcon, the Court noted the importance of
adequacy of representation in meeting the rule 23 requirements:
The commonality and typicality requirements of rule 23(a) ... serve as
guideposts for determining... whether the named plaintiff's claim and
class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members
will be fairly and adequately represented in their absence. Those require-
ments therefore also tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation
requirement, although the latter requirement also raises concerns about
competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest.1 1 8
This statement is indicative of a Court belief that evidence of
111. Apparently some courts are struggling with this issue in light of Falcon. Fe-
male Group Certified As Class in Bias Suit, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 8, 1982, at 6, col. 3.
112. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
113. 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974).
114. 102 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538,
553 (1974)).
115. 102 S. Ct. at 2371 n.13. The Court stated. '"he commonality and typicality
requirements ... [b]oth serve as guideposts for determining whether under
the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical
* "' 
d.
116. See 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTCE 11 23.02(1), at 35
(2d ed. 1982); Bridgesmith, supra note 10, at 1420. Given that class actions are
harder to certify, the Court could be taldng inconsistent positions on judicial
economy.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
118. 102 S. Ct. at 2371 n.13.
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whether a plaintiff will be an adequate class representative is not
only relevant to the rule 23(a) (4) requirement of adequate repre-
sentation but is also relevant to the rule 23(a) (2) and rule 23(a) (3)
requirements of commonality and typicality.119 Therefore, ade-
quacy of representation seems to be emphasized by the Court in
both Rodriguez and Falcon. This is consistent with the represen-
tative litigation purpose of rule 23.120
While the above three propositions are easily discerned from
Falcon and Rodriguez, they add a judicial gloss to title VII class
actions which litigators cannot afford to ignore.121 Overall, the
Court requires plaintiffs to meet all rule 23(a) requirements, but
the Court will not let rule 23(a) limit title VII when an employee is
affected by a general discriminatory employer policy which also af-
fects other employees.122 The Supreme Court doctrine of allowing
such class actions is consistent with Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.'2
and prior cases which focused on the effect of the remedy sought
by the plaintiff. 2 4 In reality this focus on the remedy mandates an
inquiry into whether the representative plaintiff and the class are
affected by a general discriminatory policy such that a remedy
given to some members of the class will bring classwide relief. The
step that was taken in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc.12 5 and subsequent cases 12 6 was where the federal courts went
astray127 from both the mandates of rule 23 and title VII.128 The
119. It is important to note that in both Falcon and Rodriguez the Court indicated
the adequacy requirement of rule 23(a) (4) turned on whether counsel had
adequately handled the case and whether there were any conflicts between
the representative plaintiff and the class members. In Rodriguez these two
factors were relied on to find that representation was not adequate, 431 U.S.
at 404-05, and in Falcon the Court noted that this inquiry distinguished rule
23(a) (4) from rule 23(a) (2) and rule 23(a) (3).
120. See generally Bridgesmith, supra note 10, at 1432 ("[R] ule 23(a) (4) adequacy
of representation is the touchstone by which title VII class action maintain-
ability should be gauged."). Because most title VII class actions are brought
under rule 23(b) (2), which does not provide for opting out, res judicata will
bar all absent class members from pursuing discrimination claims under sim-
ilar circumstances. It is therefore imperative that representation be ade-
quate. See 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE % 23.07(1)
(2d ed. 1982); see generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
121. Using Falcon and Rodriguez as precedent, considerations of judicial econ-
omy and adequacy of representation could be very important, especially in a
marginal class action certification case.
122. 102 S. Ct. at 2371-72 n.15. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
123. 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying
text.
124. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
125. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
128. But see 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.02(1), at
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relevant inquiry now is what impact this new Supreme Court doc-
trine will have on title VII enforcement.
IV. IMPACT
What impact will Rodriguez and Falcon have on the enforce-
ment of title VII? It cannot be disputed that private enforcement
of title VII has been limited by the Supreme Court's refusal to al-
low across-the-board attacks without a showing that all the re-
quirements of rule 23(a) have been met.129 An analysis of the
magnitude of this impact, however, requires focusing on the pro-
spective plaintiff's incentive and ability to bring suit and also the
effect that these cases will have on unnamed class members.
In some instances Falcon and Rodriguez will affect the plain-
tiff's incentive to bring suit. One such instance will arise when a
plaintiff individually has relatively small damages but together
with other class members the damages make the suit viable. An-
other instance will be when public interest groups such as the
NAACP have standing to sue and wish to attack a discriminatory
policy. In many cases, however, Falcon and Rodriguez will not af-
fect the plaintiffs incentive to sue since they do not affect the rem-
edies available to the plaintiff. In such circumstances these cases
will only affect the plaintiff's incentive to sue if that incentive is
built on a desire to assist other employees who are subjected to the
employer's discrimination.130
While the effect of Falcon and Rodriguez on a prospective
plaintiff's incentive to bring suit is uncertain, the effect of the two
cases on the plaintiff's ability to bring suit is more obvious. This
impact will manifest itself in the prospective plaintiff's inability to
obtain competent counsel to prosecute his action. Moreover, be-
cause of the large amounts of money necessary to prosecute a law-
suit, it will often be impractical to maintain an action. Such
inability will ultimately be a function of the settlement value of his
suit, the possible damage award, and the attorney fee awards.
The settlement value of a plaintiff's suit has definitely been lim-
ited by Rodriguez and Falcon. Prior to these decisions, a defend-
ant faced with a class action complaint knew that a plaintiff could
easily get a class certified. Class certification increased the em-
ployer's possible liability exposure and gave the plaintiff a tool to
43 (2d ed. 1982) (Rule 23 has been broadly interpreted for use by private at-
torney generals to vindicate substantive policies.).
129. Courts seem to be taking Falcon seriously and are requiring plaintiffs to
meet the rule 23 requirements. See Grant v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Warren v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 95
F.R.D. 425 (SD.N.Y. 1982).
130. But see supra note 128.
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conduct extensive discovery into an employer's operation.131 De-
fendants feared this increased scope of discovery, reasoning that
discovery was bound to uncover a few employer policies having a
discriminatory impact. Such fear of increased exposure and wide-
open discovery gave plaintiffs attorneys settlement leverage be-
cause defendants were fearful of a full blown trial.132 Such settle-
ment leverage made it much easier for a plaintiff to find a willing
attorney. 33
However, there are problems with using class allegations for
settlement leverage. One problem is whether it is ethical to in-
clude class allegations in a complaint only for the purpose of coerc-
ing the defendant to settle. In a class action it can be argued that a
plaintiffs attorney making class allegations assumes an obligation
to unnamed class members to protect their interests. 34 The issue
is whether unnamed class members are clients of the attorney
before the class is certified.135 If they are seen as his clients then
the plaintiffs motive to settle the individual claims without regard
to the class claims would involve the attorney in representing dif-
fering interests in violation of canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.136 In addition to this ethical dilemma, the inclusion
of class claims merely for settlement leverage could be a violation
of canon 7137 since the attorney is asserting a legal position merely
to harass the defendant.138 Another problem with using class
131. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (parties may discover any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action).
132. Defendants also are seldom awarded attorney fees given the Supreme Court
standard that the plaintiffs action must be frivolous, unreasonable, and with-
out foundation. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22
(1978). This increases the plaintiff's settlement leverage with a class action.
133. Class allegations can also make it more difficult to find an attorney competent
to prosecute the case.
134. In a class setting, the attorney is faced with a set of clients that change peri-
odically. If a class is certified, the attorney definitely represents all members
of the class. But if part of the class is later decertified, are those individuals
who are no longer within the class the attorney's clients?
135. Maybe this issue should turn on whether the unnamed class members relied
on the class action such that any settlement of the individual claims would
prejudice their interest.
136. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBrLrTY Canon 5 (1981). Disciplinary
Rule 5-105(A) provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall decline proffered
employment... if it would be likely to involve him in representing different
interests .... .
137. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY Canon 7 (1981).
138. Disciplinary rule 7-102 (A) (1) provides in pertinent part: "In his representa-
tion of a client, a lawyer shall not: File a suit, assert a position,. . . or take
other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that
such action would serve merely to harass ... another." MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 7-102(A) (1) (1981).
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claims for settlement leverage is rule 23(e)139 which requires that
a court approve any settlement made in a class action and that no-
tice be sent to absent class members. Before refusing to approve
such settlements or requiring that notice be sent courts usually
require a showing that the unnamed class members could be
prejudiced by the settlement.140 Nonetheless, commentators and
courts have noted the frequent abuse of class action allegations.'41
Another factor limiting the plaintiff's ability to successfully sue
is the lower total damage award with an individual suit as com-
pared to a class action suit. This lower possible damage award
places a ceiling on the amount a plaintiff can spend for trial prepa-
ration, including discovery, research, expert testimony, and ap-
peals. When a prospective plaintiff is faced with a defendant
employer who engages in extensive discovery, with depositions
and interrogatories, and files motions to limit the plaintiff's cause
of action, economic considerations weigh heavily in the plaintiff's
decision to continue the suit. The problem is also present at trial
when the plaintiff's expected damage award does not allow for full
development of his case, though he is faced with a defendant who
has developed every possible avenue to rebut the plaintiff's case.
Overall, lower possible damage awards can have a major impact on
a plaintiff's ability to successfully sue individually.
A bottom line reason why easy class certification made it easier
for plaintiffs to find competent counsel was the attorney fee
awards. Under section 706 (k)142 of title VI, a plaintiffs attorney is
allowed to collect attorney fees.143 With class actions, the possible
amount of fees recoverable increases while the extent of work
often may not increase proportionately.'"
In addition to these limitations on the prospective plaintiff's
139. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as
the court directs."
140. In Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298, 1310-13 (4th Cir. 1978), the court noted that
after a pre-certification settlement the judicial role should be modest since it
is unlikely class members will have relied on the suit and courts can inquire
as to whether there was prejudice to absent class members. See Magna v.
Platzer Shipyard Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
141. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1311 (4th Cir. 1978); Simon, Class
Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 389-91 (1972).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
143. Prevailing plaintiffs are normally awarded attorney fees in all but special cir-
cumstances. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978).
144. This could be because courts also consider a risk premium in awarding attor-
ney fees. With class actions the class attorney fee is ordinarily contingent
upon an award to the class, therefore, the attorney has a higher risk of receiv-
ing no fee. Developments, supra note 95, at 1612-17.
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ability and incentive to sue, Falcon and Rodriguez also will limit
the remedies available to unnamed class members. Once a plain-
tiffs suit is found not to be a certifiable class action, unnamed class
members are no longer parties to the suit and must seek redress
on their own. A major problem confronting the unnamed class
members is that they would not have filed with the EEOC within
the 180- or 300-day period required by statute.145 Two questions
which then arise are: (1) whether the filing period is tolled during
the period before a representative plaintiffs class is decertified or
fails to become certified and (2) whether unnamed class members
have to exhaust their administrative remedies before being al-
lowed to join or intervene in the representative plaintiffs individ-
ual suit.
As to tolling of the 180-day or 300-day filing period with the
EEOC, a district court in Green v. United States Steel Corp.,146
held that the 180-day filing period was tolled for a class member
during the pendency of the class action. In Green the plaintiff was
a member of a class which two years after certification was decerti-
fled in part. After decertification the plaintiff ified a charge with
the EEOC. The court in Green held that the filing period should be
tolled under authority of American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah,147 where the Supreme Court held that commencement of a
class suit tolled the running of the statute of limitations for puta-
tive class members from the time the original suit is instituted un-
til it is decertifled.148 The Green court seemed to limit its holding,
however, stating that the defendant in this case would not be
prejudiced since decertification was ordered only because of the
unmanageability of a broader class. Using the Green precedent, in
many decertification instances the putative class members could
file with the EEOC after decertification and not be barred by the
filing requirements. The readiness of courts to accept the Green
analysis will probably vary depending on the unfairness to the de-
fendant inherent with such a tolling rule.
The tolling issue will not arise, however, if putative class mem-
bers of a decertified class do not have to exhaust their administra-
tive remedies. In Foster v. Gueory149 the District of Columbia
Circuit held that unnamed class members of a class which was not
145. See supra note 1; Title VII § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e5(e) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
146. 481 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
147. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
148. An issue not being litigated in the courts is whether the time period under
American Pipe is tolled only for those who fie their own suit. See Parker v.
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 677 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
338 (1982).
149. 655 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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certified did not have to exhaust their administrative remedies to
intervene in the individual suit of the named plaintiffs. In so hold-
ing the District of Columbia Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit case
of Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp.15O and the rationale
of the Eighth Circuit which had allowed intervention without ex-
haustion of administrative remedies in a non-class setting.15 ' The
test for not requiring exhaustion set out in Foster required that the
claims of the parties be similar enough that "no conciliatory pur-
pose would be served by filing separate EEOC charges.' 5 2 These
cases indicate that some unnamed class members can protect their
interests by intervening or joining in the resulting individual suit
after a class is decertified or fails to be certified. The problems
faced by the representative plaintiff's attorney in this circum-
stance is how to ethically give notice to the unnamed class mem-
bers of these alternatives and how to meet the requirements of
joinder and intervention. 5 3
To send notice to these unnamed class members, an attorney
can attempt to rely on rule 23(d) (2)154 which allows the court to
send notice to class members in appropriate circumstances. At
least one court, in Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc.5 5 al-
lowed the sending of such a notice informing former class mem-
bers of their right to attempt to intervene. The Ninth Circuit,
however, in Pan American World Airways v. United States District
Court,5 6 indicated that the notice provisions of rule 23 only apply
to plaintiffs who have shown they meet the prerequisites for a
class action. 5 7 To the extent that notice is allowed to be sent, in-
tervention and joinder can be practical alternatives in smaller
150. 563 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977).
151. Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977).
152. 655 F.2d at 1322. The Foster court went on to state:
However, where the two complaints differ to the extent that there is a
real possibility that one of the claims might be administratively set-
tled while the other can be resolved only by the courts, then the ra-
tionale of Oatis does not apply. In such a case each plaintiff should
be required to separately file an EEOC charge in order to effectuate
the purpose of Title VIrs provisions for administrative relief.
Id.
153. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBarrY DR 2-103(A) (1981).
154. See supra note 10. In Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), the Supreme
Court struck down a district court injunction which limited communication
between a plaintiff's attorney of a prospective class and the potential class
members. The Supreme Court held that the district court's order exceeded
the court's authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
155. 66 F.RD. 411 (SD. Iowa 1975).
156. 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).
157. The court, therefore, would not allow notice to be sent to former class mem-
bers informing them of their right to intervene.
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class actions. These alternatives can ameliorate the adverse im-
pact on unnamed class members from the failure to get a class cer-
tified. The plaintiff, of course, must meet the requirements of
joiner and intervention.
Joinder requires a complaint filed by joined plaintiffs'5 8 or a
motion by the plaintiff to amend his complaint to add parties.159
Under rule 20 the requirements for joinder are: (1) a showing that
there is a right to relief arising out of the same transaction, occur-
rence, or series of transactions or occurrences and (2) a showing
that a common question of law or fact will arise in the action.160
One line of cases indicates that a general policy of discrimination
cannot meet the commonality requirement nor the same transac-
tion requirement.' 6 ' Another line of cases indicates that the com-
monality and same transaction requirements are met when
plaintiffs allege they are injured by a general policy of discrimina-
tion. 62 Therefore, reliance on this alternative depends on the facts
developed and the line of authority the court chooses to follow.
With the intervention alternative a primary consideration is
whether a court will grant permissive intervention163 or interven-
tion of right.164 Some courts have held that in a title VII setting
158. FED. R. Crv. P. 20(a).
159. Leave to amend is freely granted "when justice so requires." FED. R. CIv. P.
15(a).
160. FED. R. CIrv. P. 20(a).
161. The leading case in this line is Smith v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D.
515 (N.D. Okla. 1970). It has been followed by Martinez v. Safeway Stores, 66
F.R.D. 446 (N.D. Cal. 1975) and Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 15 Fair
Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 364 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In Webb the court stated:
Plaintiffs cannot simply invoke a claim of across the board discrimi-
nation to satisfy these two requirements .... No showing has been
made that discrimination against a salaried employee or a job appli-
cant arises out of the same facts or occurrences as the alleged dis-
crimination against the class representatives, members of production
and maintenance unit who work on an hourly basis.
Id. at 365.
162. The leading case in this line is Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330
(8th Cir. 1974). It has been followed by Resnick v. American Dental Assoc., 90
F.R.D. 530 (N.D. Ill. 1981) and Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dept. of White Plains, 82
F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Because Mosely relied on the across-the-board
class action cases in analyzing the commonality requirement, its continued
authority could have been somewhat undermined by Falcon.
163. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(b). The requirements of rule 24(b) are: (1) the applicant's
claims must have a question of law or fact in common with the original case,
and (2) permitting the intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
164. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a). The requirements of rule 24(a) are: (1) the individual's
motion for intervention is timely, (2) the individual claims an interest relat-
ing to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action, (3) the
individual is so situated that disposition of the action may as a practical mat-
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intervention is of right.165 Most courts, however, only discuss per-
missive intervention in a title VII setting.16 6 Courts which focus on
permissive intervention vary as to their liberality in construing the
intervention requirements. In most across-the-board situations
the requirements for permissive intervention may be difficult to
meet, but some courts liberally construe these requirements in a
title VII setting.167 As with joinder, a plaintiffs intervention suc-
cess depends on how the facts fit the intervention requirements
and which line of authority a court chooses to follow.
Given these aiternatives available to plaintiffs and the ability of
a plaintiff's attorney to recover attorneys fees, some of the adverse
impact on title VII enforcement from Falcon and Rodriguez is mit-
igated. In smaller class actions, the major impacts on a title VII
enforcement involve the effects of the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions on a plaintiff's settlement leverage and the time bar imposed
on members of the class which was not certified. The settlement
effect, however, is not all bad because in many instances it will pre-
vent an abuse of process. 68 In larger class actions, most of the
above procedural alternatives are not viable and the Supreme
Court decisions will definitely adversely affect the prospective
plaintiffs ability to successfully bring such suits.
V. CONCLUSION
Rodriguez and Falcon have limited the private enforcement
mechanism of title VII. Congress has the last word in deciding
whether the Court correctly read the policies evidenced by rule 23
and by title VII. If Congress feels title VII enforcement has been
unduly hindered, it is up to Congress to provide a rule governing
class actions separate and distinct from rule 23 or provide for more
rigorous public enforcement of title VII by the EEOC. Neither al-
ternative, however, should be prematurely acted upon by Congress
until the full effects of Falcon and Rodriguez can be discerned. In
smaller class actions, backpay awards, attorney fee awards, and
ter impair or impede his ability to protect his interests, and (4) the individual
is not adequately represented by the existing parties.
165. See, e.g., Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Underwood v. New
York, 20 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1713 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
166. See, e.g., Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 15 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
364 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Martinez v. Safeway Stores, 66 F.R.D. 446 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
167. Most of the cases discussing permissive intervention break down along the
same lines as they do with joinder since the commonality requirement of
rules 20 and 24 is the same. See cases cited supra notes 161-162. In light of
the possible effects Falcon could have on the Mosely line of cases, interven-
tion could be more difficult in the future.
168. See Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375
(1972).
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the procedural devices of intervention and joinder could mitigate
much of the limiting effect of these decisions. In larger class ac-
tions, the Supreme Court decisions may have a more limiting ef-
fect on title VII enforcement. In these latter cases, however, the
prospective plaintiff may be able to identify a general discrimina-
tory employer policy and meet the rule 23 requirements to bring an
across-the-board attack.
David Scanga '83
